A land expropriation process was modeled as a game,the bargaining skill and the ability of the developer and the land owner withstanding risks selected as the determinant factors influencing the ultimate transaction price.
基于效用最大化的原则,把土地征收双方讨价还价的过程,理解为双方的博弈;认为各自对风险抵御的能力、在征地过程中的讨价还价能力直接影响到最终达至交易的价格。
In view of cooperation between supplier and manufacturer,this article establishes a bargaining game model of random price in the presence of conditions such as existing external options,the possibility of the breakdown of negotiation and transaction,and then it comes up with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium,namely the condition of achieving cooperation agreement.
针对供应链供应商与制造商间的合作问题,在存在外部选择、考虑协商破裂的可能性、考虑交易成本的条件下,建立了随机出价的讨价还价博弈模型,并求出了唯一的子博弈精炼均衡解,即双方达成合作协议的条件。
With the negotiation means of certain capacity and uncertain price,this paper constructs the bargaining game model in Unilateral Opening Electricity Market.
在单边开放电力市场中,针对谈判型长期合同,构建了发电公司与交易中心的序贯不完全信息讨价还价博弈模型,求解模型并对所得的结果进行分析,认为合同能否达成主要取决于交易中心对发电公司单位发电成本的估计。
Bargain Mode in the Context of Government Control;
政府管制中的讨价还价模型
To explore the effective way the local government stops the collusion with the land agent,based on the model of Rubinstein alternating offers and by the method from Selten non-cooperative game,this paper analyses the non-cooperative bargaining between the local government and the land agent with part perfect information.
为了探索地方政府退出与房地产商合谋的有效途径,本文应用Rubinstein轮流出价模型和Selten非合作博弈方法,在局部完美信息条件下,分析了房地产商与地方政府的非合作讨价还价过程。
This paper describes the biding behavior about the standard of relief fund for both disaster-stricken peasants and government by setting up bargain model of game,and determines the range about standard of relief fund to rebuild houses for per capita.
通过建立讨价还价博弈模型,描述了农民建房救灾资金分配过程中政府与受灾农民就补助标准的各自出价行为,确定了人均补助标准的范围。